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The Transitional Gains Trap
The Bell Journal of Economics
Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 671-678
Published by: RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003249
Page Count: 8
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Monopoly, Blue laws, Wages, Taxis, Taxes, Customers, Employment, Civil service, Deadweight loss, Market prices
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Many government programs which appear to be designed to help some particular industry or group do not seem to be succeeding. The explanation offered here is that the program, when inaugurated, generated transitional gains for the individuals or companies in the industry, but that these have been fully capitalized, with the result that the people in the industry now are doing no better than normal. On the other hand, the termination of the particular scheme would, in general, lead to large losses for the entrenched interests.
The Bell Journal of Economics © 1975 RAND Corporation