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Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice

James G. March
The Bell Journal of Economics
Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 587-608
Published by: RAND Corporation
DOI: 10.2307/3003600
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003600
Page Count: 22
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Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice
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Abstract

Rational choice involves two guesses, a guess about uncertain future consequences and a guess about uncertain future preferences. Partly as a result of behavioral studies of choice over a twenty-year period, modifications in the way the theory deals with the first guess have become organized into conceptions of bounded rationality. Recently, behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior. These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about tastes and their role in choice. This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications.

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