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Truth and Provability

John Lucas and Michael Redhead
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 331-332
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30115229
Page Count: 2
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Abstract

The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.

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