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Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note
Karl DeRouen, Jr.
International Studies Quarterly
Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 317-328
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3014000
Page Count: 12
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This study represents an attempt at further developing the diversionary theory of force. The analysis covers the period 1949 to 1994 using a simultaneous system of equations that treat presidential approval and force as endogenous variables. After controlling for opportunities and Soviet/Russian crisis behavior, the model reveals a rally effect and that unemployment has a positive effect on force levels. I discuss how presidential decisions to divert are made in the context of poliheuristic decision processing.
International Studies Quarterly © 2000 Oxford University Press