Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Existence and Identity in Free Logic: A Problem for Inferentialism?

Neil Tennant
Mind
New Series, Vol. 116, No. 464 (Oct., 2007), pp. 1055-1078
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30166521
Page Count: 24
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Existence and Identity in Free Logic: A Problem for Inferentialism?
Preview not available

Abstract

Peter Milne (2007) poses two challenges to the inferential theorist of meaning. This study responds to both. First, it argues that the method of natural deduction idealizes the essential details of correct informal deductive reasoning. Secondly, it explains how rules of inference in free logic can determine unique senses for the existential quantifier and the identity predicate. The final part of the investigation brings out an underlying order in a basic family of free logics.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[1055]
    [1055]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1056
    1056
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1057
    1057
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1058
    1058
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1059
    1059
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1060
    1060
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1061
    1061
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1062
    1062
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1063
    1063
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1064
    1064
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1065
    1065
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1066
    1066
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1067
    1067
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1068
    1068
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1069
    1069
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1070
    1070
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1071
    1071
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1072
    1072
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1073
    1073
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1074
    1074
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1075
    1075
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1076
    1076
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1077
    1077
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1078
    1078