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Meaning and Circular Definitions

Francesco Orilia
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 155-169
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30226692
Page Count: 15
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Meaning and Circular Definitions
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Abstract

Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.

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