Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law

Isaac D. Balbus
Law & Society Review
Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter, 1977), pp. 571-588
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Law and Society Association
DOI: 10.2307/3053132
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053132
Page Count: 18
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law
Preview not available

Abstract

After a good deal of thought I have decided not to respond directly to Professor Trubek's exhaustive review of The Dialectics of Legal Repression, but will rather leave it to readers of my book to determine for themselves the adequacy of his description, analysis, and evaluation of the material contained therein. However, insofar as Professor Trubek also refers briefly in his essay to my "more recent," and until now unpublished, work, it seems appropriate to present a sample of this work, especially since Trubek himself argues that it entails a "major refinement" which "allows Balbus to explain what remains unexplained in The Dialectics." Indeed, in certain respects the following essay constitutes an autocritique of the theoretical analysis in my book, and a comparison of the two will thus permit the reader to assess indirectly the extent of my agreement with Trubek's critique. At the same time, what follows also constitutes an implicit and, at times explicit, critique of Trubek's own effort to elaborate and apply an alternative to my position, the effort he calls "critical social thought about law."

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[571]
    [571]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
572
    572
  • Thumbnail: Page 
573
    573
  • Thumbnail: Page 
574
    574
  • Thumbnail: Page 
575
    575
  • Thumbnail: Page 
576
    576
  • Thumbnail: Page 
577
    577
  • Thumbnail: Page 
578
    578
  • Thumbnail: Page 
579
    579
  • Thumbnail: Page 
580
    580
  • Thumbnail: Page 
581
    581
  • Thumbnail: Page 
582
    582
  • Thumbnail: Page 
583
    583
  • Thumbnail: Page 
584
    584
  • Thumbnail: Page 
585
    585
  • Thumbnail: Page 
586
    586
  • Thumbnail: Page 
587
    587
  • Thumbnail: Page 
588
    588