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Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes
Randall Eberts, Kevin Hollenbeck and Joe Stone
The Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 37, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 913-927
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3069621
Page Count: 15
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
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Although merit pay systems have been established in many school districts across the United States, little empirical evidence exists concerning their influence on student achievement. This paper reviews that evidence and presents case study evidence from a county where one high school piloted a merit pay system to reward student retention while another comparable high school maintained a traditional compensation system. A difference-in-differences analysis implies that merit pay increased retention, had no effect on grade point averages, reduced average daily attendance rates, and increased the percentage of students who failed.
The Journal of Human Resources © 2002 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System