Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process

William F. Brewer and Bruce L. Lambert
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 68, No. 3, Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers (Sep., 2001), pp. S176-S186
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3080944
Page Count: 11
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Theory-Ladenness of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process
Preview not available

Abstract

We use evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science to examine the issue of the theory-ladenness of perceptual observation. This evidence shows that perception is theory-laden, but that it is only strongly theory-laden when the perceptual evidence is ambiguous or degraded, or when it requires a difficult perceptual judgment. We argue that debates about the theory-ladenness issue have focused too narrowly on the issue of perceptual experience, and that a full account of the scientific process requires an examination of theory-ladenness in attention, perception, data interpretation, data production, memory, and scientific communication. We conclude that the evidence for theory-ladenness does not lead to a relativist account of scientific knowledge.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
S176
    S176
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S177
    S177
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S178
    S178
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S179
    S179
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S180
    S180
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S181
    S181
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S182
    S182
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S183
    S183
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S184
    S184
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S185
    S185
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S186
    S186