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Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt and T. Groseclose
The American Economic Review
Vol. 92, No. 4 (Sep., 2002), pp. 1138-1151
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083302
Page Count: 14
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Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer
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