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This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling
Nick Feltovich, Richmond Harbaugh and Ted To
The RAND Journal of Economics
Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 630-649
Published by: Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3087478
Page Count: 20
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Abstract
In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal, or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.
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The RAND Journal of Economics © 2002 RAND Corporation
