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Conditional Party Government in the States
John H. Aldrich and James S. Coleman Battista
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 164-172
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088420
Page Count: 9
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We extend theories of congressional parties and committees to the state legislative setting, using the variation among legislatures to explore the links between elections and parties and between parties and committees. We examine elections by comparing the electoral concentration of parties to measures of conditional party government. We examine informational and partisan theories of committees by looking to the relationship between committee representativeness and conditional party government. With data from eleven states, we find that competitive party systems breed highly polarized legislative parties, and these two traits lead to representative committees.
American Journal of Political Science © 2002 Midwest Political Science Association