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Empirical Organizational-Level Examinations of Agency and Collaborative Predictions of Performance-Contingent Compensation

Jason D. Shaw, Nina Gupta and John E. Delery
Strategic Management Journal
Vol. 21, No. 5 (May, 2000), pp. 611-623
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094144
Page Count: 13
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Empirical Organizational-Level Examinations of Agency and Collaborative Predictions of Performance-Contingent Compensation
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Abstract

Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance-contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within-industry (trucking) sample and in a cross-industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed.

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