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Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom
Vol. 68, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 249-262
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3146375
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Fishers, Fishery economics, Property rights, Fishery resources, Natural resources, Resource ownership, Proprietors, Fishing, Alienation, Fisheries management
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The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper we develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. We apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.
Land Economics © 1992 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System