You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
No. 129 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 14-19
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183385
Page Count: 6
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
As the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan winds down, should Iraq become "phase two" in the war against global terrorism? Iraq hawks warn that Saddam Hussein's arsenal of mass destruction and his fanatic hatred of the United States make him a paramount threat. Others counsel for continued diplomacy and the return of U.N. weapons inspectors, arguing that an attack on Iraq would destabilize the Arab world. To support their cases, both sides deploy cherished assumptions about everything from Saddam Hussein's sanity to the explosive volatility of the "Arab Street." But a skeptical look at the sound bites suggests that the greatest risk of attacking Iraq may not be a vengeful Saddam or a destabilized Middle East but the unraveling of the global coalition against terrorism.
Foreign Policy © 2002 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC