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Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Player. I. Two-Species Haploid or Randomly Mating Diploid
R. Cressman and A. T. Dash
Journal of Applied Probability
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 1-14
Published by: Applied Probability Trust
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3213743
Page Count: 14
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The evolution of strategies in animal contests is examined where the dynamical equation takes into account population growth rates. This leads to a different definition of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) from the usual one. Consequences for independent haploid species are then contrasted with the previous theory. Inheritance patterns for male-female contests with sex-dependent payoffs are considered. In particular, if males and females evolve independently to the same ESS, then so does the diploid species under random mating. Finally, the evolution of diploid populations where strategies are determined at a diallelic locus is investigated.
Journal of Applied Probability © 1985 Applied Probability Trust