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Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument

Sanford C. Goldberg
Analysis
Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 211-219
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Analysis Committee
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328145
Page Count: 9
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Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument
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