Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Who Preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law? Federalism and Political Accountability under Global Trade Rules

Robert Stumberg and Matthew C. Porterfield
Publius
Vol. 31, No. 3, The State of American Federalism, 2000-2001 (Summer, 2001), pp. 173-204
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330999
Page Count: 32
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Who Preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law? Federalism and Political Accountability under Global Trade Rules
Preview not available

Abstract

With its "Burma law," Massachusetts joined a procurement boycott of companies doing business in Burma. In Crosby v. NFTC, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress preempted the Massachusetts law, even though Congress was silent on preemption. The Court relied on actions by executive-branch, foreign, and corporate actors to find that the state law was an obstacle to implied objectives of federal Burma sanctions. In doing so, the Court diffused congressional accountability for preemption and constrained the "constituent diplomacy" by which states and local governments use their purchasing power to influence national policy and multinational corporations. Crosby shifted the burden to Congress to express its intent not to preempt such measures. Congress has several opportunities to meet this burden if it wants to preserve the diversity and balance that constituent diplomacy brings to the federal system.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
173
    173
  • Thumbnail: Page 
174
    174
  • Thumbnail: Page 
175
    175
  • Thumbnail: Page 
176
    176
  • Thumbnail: Page 
177
    177
  • Thumbnail: Page 
178
    178
  • Thumbnail: Page 
179
    179
  • Thumbnail: Page 
180
    180
  • Thumbnail: Page 
181
    181
  • Thumbnail: Page 
182
    182
  • Thumbnail: Page 
183
    183
  • Thumbnail: Page 
184
    184
  • Thumbnail: Page 
185
    185
  • Thumbnail: Page 
186
    186
  • Thumbnail: Page 
187
    187
  • Thumbnail: Page 
188
    188
  • Thumbnail: Page 
189
    189
  • Thumbnail: Page 
190
    190
  • Thumbnail: Page 
191
    191
  • Thumbnail: Page 
192
    192
  • Thumbnail: Page 
193
    193
  • Thumbnail: Page 
194
    194
  • Thumbnail: Page 
195
    195
  • Thumbnail: Page 
196
    196
  • Thumbnail: Page 
197
    197
  • Thumbnail: Page 
198
    198
  • Thumbnail: Page 
199
    199
  • Thumbnail: Page 
200
    200
  • Thumbnail: Page 
201
    201
  • Thumbnail: Page 
202
    202
  • Thumbnail: Page 
203
    203
  • Thumbnail: Page 
204
    204