Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector

Sandra Van Thiel and Frans L. Leeuw
Public Performance & Management Review
Vol. 25, No. 3 (Mar., 2002), pp. 267-281
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
DOI: 10.2307/3381236
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3381236
Page Count: 15
  • Download ($45.00)
  • Cite this Item
The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector
Preview not available

Abstract

Administrative reform has led to a strong increase in the use of performance assessment instruments in the public sector. However, this has also led to several unintended consequences, such as the performance paradox, tunnel vision, and "analysis paralysis." These unintended consequences can reduce the quality of the knowledge about actual levels of performance or even negatively affect performance. Examples can be found in all policy sectors. The authors argue that certain characteristics of the public sector--such as ambiguous policy objectives, discretionary authority of street-level bureaucrats, simultaneous production and consumption of services, and the disjunction of costs and revenues--increase the risk of a performance paradox, either unintentionally or deliberately. Performance assessment should therefore take the special characteristics of the public sector into account and develop systems that can handle contested and multiple performance indicators, striking a balance in the degree of "measure pressure" and minimizing dysfunctional effects.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
267
    267
  • Thumbnail: Page 
268
    268
  • Thumbnail: Page 
269
    269
  • Thumbnail: Page 
270
    270
  • Thumbnail: Page 
271
    271
  • Thumbnail: Page 
272
    272
  • Thumbnail: Page 
273
    273
  • Thumbnail: Page 
274
    274
  • Thumbnail: Page 
275
    275
  • Thumbnail: Page 
276
    276
  • Thumbnail: Page 
277
    277
  • Thumbnail: Page 
278
    278
  • Thumbnail: Page 
279
    279
  • Thumbnail: Page 
280
    280
  • Thumbnail: Page 
281
    281