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Law, Fact and Legal Language
Law and Philosophy
Vol. 18, No. 5, Laws, Facts, and Values (Sep., 1999), pp. 461-473
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3505140
Page Count: 13
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This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure 'brute facts' do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on 'applicability rules'. The problem of 'mixed terms' is partly a matter of judicial pragmatics, partly to do with the character of applicability rules, and their extensiveness. Semantic realism versus semantic instrumentalism in respect of legal terms -- the latter preferred. Tendency to abstract terms in advanced legal orders.
Law and Philosophy © 1999 Springer