Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Occupational Safety and Health: A Problem of Double or Single Moral Hazard

Paul Lanoie
The Journal of Risk and Insurance
Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 80-100
DOI: 10.2307/3520049
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3520049
Page Count: 21
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($9.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Occupational Safety and Health: A Problem of Double or Single Moral Hazard
Preview not available

Abstract

Following Cooper and Ross (1985), this article contributes to the literature by developing a principal-agent approach to the effect of imperfect information on safety in the workplace. Firms and workers can influence the probability of workplace accidents by taking precautions. To the extent that a worker's precaution cannot be observed by a firm, and vice versa, contract designing is a problem characterized by moral hazard. Double and single moral hazard lead to nonoptimal levels of precaution from firms and workers, but not necessarily to an underprovision of precaution. Furthermore, it is shown that regulatory policies aimed at promoting safety in the workplace (by inducing increases in the levels of precaution) may not be welfare-improving.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[80]
    [80]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
81
    81
  • Thumbnail: Page 
82
    82
  • Thumbnail: Page 
83
    83
  • Thumbnail: Page 
84
    84
  • Thumbnail: Page 
85
    85
  • Thumbnail: Page 
86
    86
  • Thumbnail: Page 
87
    87
  • Thumbnail: Page 
88
    88
  • Thumbnail: Page 
89
    89
  • Thumbnail: Page 
90
    90
  • Thumbnail: Page 
91
    91
  • Thumbnail: Page 
92
    92
  • Thumbnail: Page 
93
    93
  • Thumbnail: Page 
94
    94
  • Thumbnail: Page 
95
    95
  • Thumbnail: Page 
96
    96
  • Thumbnail: Page 
97
    97
  • Thumbnail: Page 
98
    98
  • Thumbnail: Page 
99
    99
  • Thumbnail: Page 
100
    100