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Transcendental Arguments against Eliminativism

Robert Lockie
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 569-589
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541679
Page Count: 21
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Transcendental Arguments against Eliminativism
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Abstract

Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature-the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position-eliminativism-they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the 'Paradox of Abandonment'). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown to be separately inadequate, mutually incompatible, and, again, incompatible with the position that they are seeking to defend.

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