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Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun., 2005), pp. 191-198
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541699
Page Count: 8
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Huw Price () has offered evidential decision theorists a defence against the charge that they make unintuitive recommendations for cases like Newcomb's Problem. He says that when conditional probabilities are assessed from the agent's point of view, evidential decision theory makes the same recommendation as intuition. I argue that calculating the probabilities in Price's way leads to no recommendation. It condemns the agent to perpetual oscillation between different options.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science © 2005 The British Society for the Philosophy of Science