If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Varieties of Propensity

Donald Gillies
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 807-835
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541728
Page Count: 29
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Varieties of Propensity
Preview not available

Abstract

The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two singlecase propensity theories, one due to Miller and the later Popper, and the other to Fetzer. The three approaches are compared by examining how they deal with a key problem for the propensity approach, namely the relationship between propensity and causality and Humphreys' paradox.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[807]
    [807]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
808
    808
  • Thumbnail: Page 
809
    809
  • Thumbnail: Page 
810
    810
  • Thumbnail: Page 
811
    811
  • Thumbnail: Page 
812
    812
  • Thumbnail: Page 
813
    813
  • Thumbnail: Page 
814
    814
  • Thumbnail: Page 
815
    815
  • Thumbnail: Page 
816
    816
  • Thumbnail: Page 
817
    817
  • Thumbnail: Page 
818
    818
  • Thumbnail: Page 
819
    819
  • Thumbnail: Page 
820
    820
  • Thumbnail: Page 
821
    821
  • Thumbnail: Page 
822
    822
  • Thumbnail: Page 
823
    823
  • Thumbnail: Page 
824
    824
  • Thumbnail: Page 
825
    825
  • Thumbnail: Page 
826
    826
  • Thumbnail: Page 
827
    827
  • Thumbnail: Page 
828
    828
  • Thumbnail: Page 
829
    829
  • Thumbnail: Page 
830
    830
  • Thumbnail: Page 
831
    831
  • Thumbnail: Page 
832
    832
  • Thumbnail: Page 
833
    833
  • Thumbnail: Page 
834
    834
  • Thumbnail: Page 
835
    835