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The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

Michael Strevens
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 913-918
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541872
Page Count: 6
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The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
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Abstract

Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim.

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