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The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 913-918
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3541872
Page Count: 6
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Fitelson and Waterman's () principal objection to Strevens's () Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science © 2005 The British Society for the Philosophy of Science