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Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics

Ira M. Schnall
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 54, No. 217 (Oct., 2004), pp. 587-594
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542746
Page Count: 8
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Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics
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Abstract

Meta-ethical discussions commonly distinguish 'subjectivism' from 'emotivism', or 'expressivism'. But Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have argued that plausible assumptions in the philosophy of language entail that expressivism collapses into subjectivism. Though there have been responses to their argument, I think the responses have not adequately diagnosed the real weakness in it. I suggest my own diagnosis, and defend expressivism as a viable theory distinct from subjectivism.

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