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Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics
Ira M. Schnall
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 54, No. 217 (Oct., 2004), pp. 587-594
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542746
Page Count: 8
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Meta-ethical discussions commonly distinguish 'subjectivism' from 'emotivism', or 'expressivism'. But Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have argued that plausible assumptions in the philosophy of language entail that expressivism collapses into subjectivism. Though there have been responses to their argument, I think the responses have not adequately diagnosed the real weakness in it. I suggest my own diagnosis, and defend expressivism as a viable theory distinct from subjectivism.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2004 Oxford University Press