You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Confused Thought and Modes of Presentation
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 55, No. 218 (Jan., 2005), pp. 21-36
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542766
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Referents, Thought, Fregean content, Identity theory, Cognitive models, Judgment, Sameness, Cognition, Uncles, Philosophy
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought requires recognizing modes of presentation.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2005 Oxford University Press