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Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?

Nicholas Shea
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 201-213
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542864
Page Count: 13
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Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?
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Abstract

In 'Mental Events' Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified 'Yes'. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.

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