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Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 201-213
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542864
Page Count: 13
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In 'Mental Events' Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified 'Yes'. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2003 Oxford University Press