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Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 55, No. 219 (Apr., 2005), pp. 315-318
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542893
Page Count: 4
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Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2005 Oxford University Press