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A-Theory for B-Theorists

Josh Parsons
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 52, No. 206 (Jan., 2002), pp. 1-20
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543006
Page Count: 20
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A-Theory for B-Theorists
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Abstract

I attempt to characterize the A-theory of time in such a way as to avoid certain standard objections to it, like those derived from McTaggart's paradox. These objections often arise from conflation of the A-theory with other doctrines which are not entailed by it, but which happen to be held by individual A-theorists. In my view, the A-theory is most defensible when combined with a certain analysis of tense (which I call 'the counterfactual theory of tense'), and with realism about the past and future.

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