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Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics

John P. Burgess
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 54, No. 214 (Jan., 2004), pp. 38-55
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543075
Page Count: 18
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Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics
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Abstract

Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose.

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