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Demons and the Isolation Argument

Scott Hendricks
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 55, No. 220 (Jul., 2005), pp. 403-418
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543095
Page Count: 16
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Demons and the Isolation Argument
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Abstract

Justifying a belief gives reason to think that the belief is true. So our concept of justification contains a 'truth connection'. I canvass a number of proposals for analysing this. In the end, two competing conceptions of the truth connection remain: the first, that justifying a belief makes the belief objectively probable, the second, that justifying a belief makes the belief probable in a world which would make true our other beliefs. I discuss reasons for embracing and rejecting these two versions of the truth connection. Ultimately, the two versions appear to represent distinct but equally plausible conceptions of justification. I conclude by rejecting the proposal that these truth connections respectively capture internalist and externalist conceptions of justification.

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