You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
'By Leibniz's Law': Remarks on a Fallacy
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 56, No. 222 (Jan., 2006), pp. 39-54
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543146
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Identity of indiscernibles, Intellectual property law, Property law, Legal entities, Concept of being, Reasoning, Wisdom, Nonsense, Carts, Inference
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where 'Leibniz's law' is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. I then argue that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2006 Oxford University Press