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The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis

Paul C. Missios and Charles Plourde
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques
Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 144-150
DOI: 10.2307/3551905
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3551905
Page Count: 7
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The Canada-European Union Turbot War: A Brief Game Theoretic Analysis
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Abstract

Cet article examine le conflit des quotas de pêche du turbot sur les Grands Bancs de Terre-Neuve entre l'Union Européenne et le Canada. La théorie des jeux est utilisée pour analyser la politique canadienne, la politique européenne et la résolution qui en a découlée. Nous énonçons des recommandations pour des accords futurs de gestion de stocks de poisson afin d'assurer la viabilité à long terme de ces ressources. /// This paper examines the conflict over catch quotas for turbot on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland between the European Union (EU) and Canada. Economic game theory is used to analyse Canadian policy, EU policy, and the ensuing resolution. Recommendations are provided for future agreements regarding the proper management of fish stocks to ensure the long-term viability of these resources.

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