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All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards
Todd Kaplan, Israel Luski, Aner Sela and David Wettstein
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Vol. 50, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 417-430
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569781
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Auctions, Cost functions, Publishing industry, Paradoxes, Patents, Bidding, Revenue, Economic theory, Economic competition, Lobbying
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We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.
The Journal of Industrial Economics © 2002 Wiley