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Bounded Rationality at Large: Technological Standards in Airwaves Auctions

Jeroen Bruggeman, Hendrik Jan Visser and Wouter van Rossum
Social Forces
Vol. 82, No. 1 (Sep., 2003), pp. 169-173
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598142
Page Count: 5
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Bounded Rationality at Large: Technological Standards in Airwaves Auctions
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Abstract

In industries characterized by several technological standards, each with positive network externalities, competition is different from industries with technologically "loosely coupled" organizations. We therefore expected that in airwaves auctions for mobile telephony in the U.S., network externalities would show up in firms' bidding. They did, although most firms were penny-wise but pound-foolish.

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