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Large Robust Games

Ehud Kalai
Econometrica
Vol. 72, No. 6 (Nov., 2004), pp. 1631-1665
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598763
Page Count: 35
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Large Robust Games
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Abstract

With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are "extensively robust." This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.

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