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The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution
David H. Clark and William Reed
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 609-624
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3647735
Page Count: 16
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While a growing body of work provides empirical support for the notion that political leaders "substitute" foreign policies depending on a variety of domestic political and economic conditions, little work examines the underlying strategic causes of substitution. This article argues that foreign states behave strategically in order to (a) avoid becoming the targets of domestically troubled executives or (b) to take advantage of the domestic trouble another state endures. Such "strategic interaction" delimits the set of foreign policies reasonably available to leaders in trouble at home, thus producing the impetus for policy substitution. This article develops a theoretical model of strategic behavior and policy substitution and reports empirical results of a multivariate probit model.
American Journal of Political Science © 2005 Midwest Political Science Association