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Value Theory without Efficiency

Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman and Robert James Weber
Mathematics of Operations Research
Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1981), pp. 122-128
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689271
Page Count: 7
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Value Theory without Efficiency
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Abstract

A semivalue is a symmetric positive linear operator on a space of games, which leaves the additive games fixed. Such an operator satisfies all of the axioms defining the Shapley value, with the possible exception of the efficiency axiom. The class of semivalues is completely characterized for the space of finite-player games, and for the space pNA of nonatomic games.

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