You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber
Mathematics of Operations Research
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 619-632
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689430
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Topological theorems, Economic theory, Mixed strategy, Existence theorems, Perceptron convergence procedure, Topological compactness, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical functions
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of "distributional" strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy ∈-equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.
Mathematics of Operations Research © 1985 INFORMS