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Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information

Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber
Mathematics of Operations Research
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 619-632
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689430
Page Count: 14
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Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
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Abstract

We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models. Using the notion of "distributional" strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy ∈-equilibrium existence theorem, and (iv) a theorem describing how the set of equilibria of a game varies with the parameters of the game.

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