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On Repeated Games with Complete Information
Mathematics of Operations Research
Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), pp. 147-160
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3690060
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Repeated games, Nash equilibrium, Theater, Information economics, Line segments, Game theory, Prisoners dilemma, Critical values, Topological theorems
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We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor.
Mathematics of Operations Research © 1986 INFORMS