Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Product Standards, Trade Disputes, and Protectionism

Daniel M. Sturm
The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique
Vol. 39, No. 2 (May, 2006), pp. 564-581
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Canadian Economics Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3696169
Page Count: 18
  • Download ($5.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Product Standards, Trade Disputes, and Protectionism
Preview not available

Abstract

Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a 'disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two-country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[564]
    [564]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
565
    565
  • Thumbnail: Page 
566
    566
  • Thumbnail: Page 
567
    567
  • Thumbnail: Page 
568
    568
  • Thumbnail: Page 
569
    569
  • Thumbnail: Page 
570
    570
  • Thumbnail: Page 
571
    571
  • Thumbnail: Page 
572
    572
  • Thumbnail: Page 
573
    573
  • Thumbnail: Page 
574
    574
  • Thumbnail: Page 
575
    575
  • Thumbnail: Page 
576
    576
  • Thumbnail: Page 
577
    577
  • Thumbnail: Page 
578
    578
  • Thumbnail: Page 
579
    579
  • Thumbnail: Page 
580
    580
  • Thumbnail: Page 
581
    581