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Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction

J. J. C. Smart
Philosophy
Vol. 74, No. 289 (Jul., 1999), pp. 431-437
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751844
Page Count: 7
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Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction
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