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No Expectations

Mark Colyvan
Mind
Vol. 115, No. 459 (Jul., 2006), pp. 695-702
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840587
Page Count: 8
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No Expectations
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Abstract

The Pasadena paradox presents a serious challenge for decision theory. The paradox arises from a game that has well-defined probabilities and utilities for each outcome, yet, apparently, does not have a well-defined expectation. In this paper, I argue that this paradox highlights a limitation of standard decision theory. This limitation can be (largely) overcome by embracing dominance reasoning and, in particular, by recognising that dominance reasoning can deliver the correct results in situations where standard decision theory fails. This, in turn, pushes us towards pluralism about decision rules.

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