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Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum

Eric Marcus
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 56, No. 224 (Jul., 2006), pp. 321-339
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840945
Page Count: 19
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Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum
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Abstract

Various thought-experiments have been offered as independent support for the possibility of intentionalism-defeating spectrum inversion, but they do not succeed. I refute what I take to be the four best arguments for holding that the thought-experiments do in fact provide such support: the implausible error argument, the symmetry argument, the no-inference argument and the best theory of representation argument. I thus offer a defence of intentionalism against a long-standing objection.

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