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How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda

Regine Andersen
Third World Quarterly
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Jun., 2000), pp. 441-456
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993333
Page Count: 16
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How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda
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Abstract

Previous to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, multilateral development agencies promoted three different strategies in the country. These were economic structural adjustment programmes, the multiparty democratisation process and the peace negotiation and implementation process (in co-operation with the OAU). In this article, I propose that these three strategies had contradictory and mutually negating effects on each other, and that they in combination contributed to a weakening of the regime. The conclusion is that these strategies--despite the best intentions--triggered the conflict. The article ends with a discussion of lessons to learn with regard to the role of multilateral development agencies in crisis prevention.

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