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Does Divorce Law Matter?

Giulio Fella, Marco Mariotti and Paola Manzini
Journal of the European Economic Association
Vol. 2, No. 4 (Jun., 2004), pp. 607-633
Published by: Wiley on behalf of European Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40004875
Page Count: 27
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Does Divorce Law Matter?
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Abstract

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

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