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Markets for Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping versus Bundling

James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
Journal of the European Economic Association
Vol. 3, No. 2/3, Papers and Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (Apr. - May, 2005), pp. 745-754
Published by: Wiley on behalf of European Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40005016
Page Count: 10
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Markets for Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping versus Bundling
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Abstract

We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle.

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