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Divine Command Theories and Human Analogies
John L. Hammond
The Journal of Religious Ethics
Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 216-223
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015031
Page Count: 8
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Some writers employ human analogies in their attempts to defend a "divine command theory" of the foundation of morals. I argue that this strategy is self-defeating. Appeal to human analogies has implications which tend to undermine any interesting or full-bodied version of divine command theory. Indeed, this line of discussion suggests there is a logical confusion in the very idea that some agent-even God-might bring about obligations by an act of will.
The Journal of Religious Ethics © 1986 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc