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Robert Adams's Theistic Argument from the Nature of Morality
Stephen J. Sullivan
The Journal of Religious Ethics
Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), pp. 303-312
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015172
Page Count: 10
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In "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief" Robert Merrihew Adams defends a theistic argument from the nature of morality according to which the existence of God is entailed by the divine-command theory, which Adams believes is our best account of morality. In reply I examine the four arguments for the modified divine-command theory that Adams develops in this and later papers, and I show that three of the arguments are much too weak to enable him to make a case for theism in this way and that the fourth itself depends on the assumption that there is a God and so would render that case circular.
The Journal of Religious Ethics © 1993 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc